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Abstract 
 
This study examines the association between rollover risk and tax avoidance. Rollover risk, also 
referred to as refinancing risk, is the risk that firms are not able to obtain new debt to refinance 
their existing debt. On the one hand, firms may avoid taxes to generate cash internally. On the 
other hand, tax avoidance can increase the cost of debt. Our findings suggest that, in general, a 
positive relationship exists between rollover risk and tax avoidance. In cross-sectional analyses, 
we find that the positive association between rollover risk and tax avoidance is more pronounced 
for firms with financial constraints and weaker for firms that issue enough new long-term debt to 
replace maturing long-term debt. Moreover, this positive association is attenuated when the market 
interest rates are higher. Furthermore, financially constrained firms operating in a higher market 
interest rates environment exhibit a further reduction in the positive association between rollover 
risk and tax avoidance. Finally, we find that firms engage in tax avoidance in anticipation of debt 
maturing in the following year. The findings are informative to debt holders, shareholders, and 
policy makers who have an interest in shaping firms’ tax avoidance activities. Overall, our findings 
suggest that firms trade off tax savings against increment cost of new borrowings when refinancing. 
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1 Introduction 
Rollover risk, also referred to as refinancing risk, is the risk that firms are not able to 
acquire new debt to refinance their maturing debt. Diamond (1991) and Titman (1992) show that 
in the presence of credit market frictions, firms may face difficulties in rolling over their maturing 
debt. These challenges include the likelihood that the firms are not able to refinance their maturing 
debt or, if they are able to refinance it, the new debt must be obtained at unfavorable interest rates. 
Recent literature has documented various adverse effects arising from rollover risk. He and Xiong 
(2012a) analyze a theoretical model where a borrower encounters refinancing risk, and the creditor 
may choose not to roll over the borrower’s debt in a dynamic setting, in which other creditors may 
choose to run on the borrower. Additionally, Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) find that firms 
accumulate more cash and save more cash from cash flows when faced with rollover risk. Thus, 
managers have an incentive to generate internal funds to facilitate the refinancing process.  
Prior literature has documented the use of cash tax savings as an internal source of cash. 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) find that tax avoidance can result in substantial cash tax 
savings, which increases expected future cash flows. In addition, when firms are faced with 
financial constraints, they implement tax avoidance strategies to generate greater cash savings (e.g., 
Edwards, Schwab, and Shevlin 2016; Law and Mills 2015). However, tax avoidance can increase 
the variance and covariances of a firm’s cash flows (Goh, Lee, Lim, and Shevlin 2016), thereby 
increasing the cost of debt and equity capital. For instance, tax avoidance is associated with larger 
loan spreads (Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang 2014; Isin 2018). Additionally, Shevlin, Urcan, and 
Vasvari (2013) find that tax avoidance increases public bond yield spreads, suggesting that debt 
holders are exposed to the risks of tax avoidance, but do not share the rewards from tax savings.  
2 
 
Therefore, it is an empirical question as to whether rollover risk is associated with higher 
or lower levels of tax avoidance. On the one hand, faced with rollover risk, firms may use cash tax 
savings generated through tax planning to pay down some of their maturing debt or present a 
stronger financial position to their existing and potential debt holders. For example, Harford, Klasa, 
and Maxwell (2014) find that firms increase cash holdings in the presence of rollover risk. 
Therefore, cash savings from tax avoidance can help the firms to meet their cash reserve 
requirements. On the other hand, tax avoidance can be costly to a firm because the interest rates 
of refinanced debt may rise due to tax avoidance activities (Hasan et al. 2014; Shevlin et al. 2013). 
A positive (negative) association between rollover risk and tax avoidance will be observed if the 
former cash flow effect (latter interest rate effect) of tax avoidance dominates. If the two effects 
offset each other, then we will not find a significant relationship between rollover risk and tax 
avoidance. 
Based on the countervailing consequences of tax avoidance, we form our null hypothesis 
that rollover risk is not associated with tax avoidance. We test our hypothesis in the following 
steps. First, following prior literature (Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner 2011; 
Gopalan, Song, and Yerramilli 2014; Wang, Chiu, and Peña 2016), we measure rollover risk using 
the ex-ante variation in the current due portion of long-term debt. The long-term debt coming due 
results from past financing choices such that refinancing the maturing portion of the long-term 
debt is exogenous to current operating decisions. Accordingly, we construct our rollover risk 
measure LT_DUE1t−1 as the current portion of long-term debt, which is the ratio of long-term debt 
at the end of year t−1 that will mature in year t to total assets at the end of year t−1. 
We then incorporate this measure in the tax avoidance model. We use cash effective tax 
rate (hereafter, CETR) as our measure of tax avoidance. We choose CETR because the underlying 
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assumption in our study is that cash tax savings can be used to facilitate the debt refinancing 
process. Using a sample with requisite data spanning from 1987 to 2016, we find that a larger 
amount of maturing debt relative to total assets, i.e., higher rollover risk, is associated with a lower 
CETR after controlling for well-known factors associated with cash effective tax rate as well as 
industry and year fixed effects. This finding rejects our null hypothesis, suggesting that firms 
engage in higher levels of tax avoidance when they face a higher rollover risk. Our finding sheds 
light on the interplay between a firm’s financial policy, particularly the maturing structure of long-
term debt, and its tax planning strategy.  
We perform several cross-sectional analyses to corroborate our main finding. First, a recent 
stream of literature investigates the influence of financial constraints on tax avoidance (e.g., 
Edwards et al. 2016; Law and Mills 2015; Dyreng and Markle 2016). On the one hand, Edwards 
et al. (2016) and Law and Mills (2015) find a positive relationship between financial constraints 
and tax avoidance. On the other hand, Dyreng and Markle (2016) find that financially constrained 
firms shift less income from the U.S. to foreign countries than their unconstrained counterparts, 
suggesting that there is a negative relationship between financial constraints and aggressive tax 
planning. In our setting, financial constraints may limit the firms’ ability to pay down some of their 
maturing debt or acquire new debt during refinancing, which may prompt the firms to rely more 
heavily on cash savings from tax avoidance to mitigate rollover risk. Alternatively, since 
financially constrained firms likely bear higher interest rates on their debt due to lack of financial 
resources, they may be more sensitive to the incremental cost of interest on the new debt stemming 
from tax avoidance activities. We measure financial constraints by the availability of credit rating, 
Z-score, firm size, and cash holdings. The findings show that financial constraints, on average, 
strengthen the positive relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance. 
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Next, we expect that if a firm is able to refinance maturing debt, it should rely less on tax 
savings to reduce the negative effect of tax avoidance on refinanced debt (i.e., higher cost of 
interest). We test this expectation using issuance of debt in the year of debt refinancing as a 
moderating effect. We find that the positive relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance 
is weaker for firms whose issuances of new long-term debt are greater than or equal to maturing 
debt. Our findings support the notion that firms conduct less tax avoidance if they are able to roll 
over maturing debt. 
Third, we conduct further analyses to provide evidence as to whether the marginal cost of 
tax avoidance may exceed the marginal benefit of it under certain circumstances. As discussed 
above, the cost of tax avoidance may exceed the benefit of it because debt holders consider tax 
avoidance as a risk factor (Hasan et al. 2014; Shevlin et al. 2013), thereby increasing the interest 
cost of refinanced debt or exacerbating the risk that the firm will not be able to roll over its maturing 
debt. We explore the effect of market interest rates on the relationship between rollover risk and 
tax avoidance. Because a higher market interest rate already makes refinancing costlier, the 
incremental cost of debt due to tax avoidance will be more likely to exceed the incremental benefit 
of tax avoidance under this circumstance. Thus, in the presence of higher market interest rates, 
firms may choose to avoid taxes to a lesser degree. Therefore, we expect that the positive 
association between rollover risk and tax avoidance to be less pronounced when the market interest 
rates are higher. We obtain the market interest rates data, i.e., the commercial and industrial loan 
rates spreads over the intended federal funds rate, from the Federal Reserve’s website.1 Interacting 
market interest rate with rollover risk, we find that the positive association between rollover risk 
                                                          
1 https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/e2chart.htm. 
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and tax avoidance is indeed less pronounced, suggesting that the marginal cost of tax avoidance 
exceeds the marginal benefit of it during refinancing if the market interest rates are higher. 
Fourth, we examine the interactive effect of financial constraints and market interest rates 
on the relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance. Because financial constraints (market 
interest rates) magnify (reduce) the positive association between rollover risk and tax avoidance, 
the net interactive effect of financial constraints and market interest rates depends on the relative 
importance of these two effects. Thus, compared with the rest of the firms, the subset of financially 
distressed firms in a high market-interest-rate environment may exhibit higher (lower) levels of 
tax avoidance when faced with rollover risk if a net positive cash flow effect (negative interest rate 
effect) of tax avoidance exists. To examine this question, we interact the rollover risk measure 
LT_DUE1t−1 with proxies of financial constraints and market interest rates. We find that the 
positive association between rollover risk and tax avoidance is further reduced for financially 
constrained firms in a high market-interest-rate environment relative to firms without financial 
distress when the market interest rates are high. These results are consistent with the notion that 
when the market interest rates are higher, firms with financial constraints face greater incremental 
refinancing costs than direct cash tax savings arising from tax avoidance. 
In an additional analysis, we explore whether firms avoid taxes when they have long-term 
debt maturing beyond one year. Firms may begin to conduct tax avoidance activities prior to the 
year of debt maturity because lenders are likely to assess firm performance and financial position 
for a period of more than one year. Specifically, we include in the regression LT_DUE2t−1, which 
is the amount of long-term debt maturing in year t+1 as of the end of year t−1 scaled by total assets. 
Our results show that both LT_DUE1t−1 and LT_DUE2t−1 are positively associated with tax 
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avoidance in year t, suggesting that firms engage in tax avoidance in year t to mitigate rollover risk 
in both years t and t+1. 
We perform several robustness tests to corroborate our findings. First, we repeat our main 
analysis by controlling for firm and year fixed effects rather than industry and year fixed effects 
in the regression. Our results are not sensitive to this specification. Second, we relax the 
assumption of a linear relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance by defining a dummy 
variable which equals one if the rollover risk measure LT_DUE1t−1 is greater than 0.049 (which is 
the sample mean plus one standard deviation), and zero otherwise. We conduct this analysis 
because rollover risk may only be an issue when the amount of maturing long-term debt is large 
enough (Gopalan et al. 2014). We continue to find a positive relationship between rollover risk 
measured by this dummy variable and tax avoidance.  
Finally, although endogeneity is not a major concern in the construction of our rollover 
risk measure because the maturing debt as of the end of year t−1 was originated several years ago, 
one may still argue that smart CEOs may be able to foresee in year t−1 the firms’ tax avoidance 
activities and consequently the amount of cash generated through tax avoidance in year t. For 
instance, in year t−1, smart managers may predict a low level of cash generated from tax avoidance 
in year t and thus refinance in year t−1 some of the debt maturing in year t, thereby affecting the 
rollover risk measure LT_DUE1t−1 because it is measured at the end of year t−1. To mitigate this 
concern, we replace LT_DUE1t−1 with LT_DUE2t−2, which is measured as the amount of debt 
maturing in two years (i.e., year t) as of the end of year t−2. Then, we regress tax avoidance in 
year t on LT_DUE2t−2. Consistent with our main finding, we continue to find a positive relationship 
between this alternative measure of rollover risk and tax avoidance. 
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This paper contributes to the literature on rollover risk and tax avoidance. First, our 
findings expand the understanding of researchers on factors associated with firms’ tax avoidance 
decisions. Our paper answers the call for research to examine the consequences of “real” corporate 
decisions on firms’ tax reporting practices (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). While the tax research in 
accounting and finance has focused on determinants of tax avoidance in terms of firm 
characteristics, managerial effects, ownership, governance, and incentives, an examination of the 
effect of firms’ financial policy on tax avoidance is missing. Specifically, our paper documents an 
association between a firm’s financial structure, namely debt maturing schedule, and its cash tax 
avoidance. This paper provides new evidence to the tax avoidance literature in that rollover risk 
arising from maturing long-term debt is positively associated with tax avoidance.  
Our study also extends the literature on the association between tax avoidance and cost of 
debt (Hasan et al. 2014; Shevlin et al. 2013) by showing that firms avoid taxes to a less degree due 
to incremental cost of debt under certain circumstances. This finding differentiates the current 
study from Edwards et al. (2016) and Law and Mills (2015) that document a positive relationship 
between financial constraints and tax avoidance. Although firms with either rollover risk or 
financial constraints can benefit from cash tax savings, financially constrained firms do not 
necessarily encounter rollover risk. Nor do firms faced with rollover risk necessarily have financial 
constraints. Thus, investigating the effect of rollover risk on tax avoidance, as well as the 
interactive effect of rollover risk and financial constraints on tax avoidance, provides us with a 
setting in which we can separate the positive cash flow consequence and the negative interest cost 
of debt consequence associated with tax avoidance. This unique setting helps researchers to better 
understand the countervailing consequences of tax planning strategies and, therefore, the desired 
level of tax avoidance given specific firm- and market-level circumstances. 
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 Furthermore, our findings enrich the literature on rollover risk. Harford et al. (2014) 
document that firms increase their cash holdings and save more cash from cash flows in order to 
mitigate the refinancing risk associated with shorter maturity debt. Because cash tax savings are 
an internal source of cash, the need for cash due to rollover risk can be partially fulfilled by cash 
tax savings. Our results extend this line of research by providing evidence that rollover risk can be 
mitigated by greater cash savings through tax avoidance. In regards to the cash flow generated 
internally through tax avoidance, our study also differs from Edwards et al. (2016) and Law and 
Mills (2015). While financially constrained firms may avoid taxes to satisfy their cash needs in 
general, firms faced with rollover risk engage in tax avoidance to meet their immediate cash needs. 
Finally, our study integrates topics of a firm’s financial policy and tax avoidance activities.  
Brunnermeier and Yogo (2009) analyze a model in which firms can manage rollover risk through 
an optimal dynamic choice of debt maturity structure. Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2016) 
document that bond granularity (i.e., a dispersed bond maturity structure) benefits firms in terms 
of financing availability, cost of financing, and stock return volatility. Our findings have practical 
implications for a firm’s choice of its debt maturity structure because credit frictions stemming 
from it have an effect on corporate tax avoidance activities. To the extent that debt holders, 
shareholders, and policy makers have an interest in firms’ tax policies, understanding the 
relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance is salient. Since shorter debt maturity leads 
to more frequent refinancing needs and rollover risk is positively associated with tax avoidance, 
firms should consider structuring long-term debt maturity in a way that reduces credit frictions and 
rollover risk during debt refinancing if the goal is to reduce tax avoidance. 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our research methodology and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Literature on tax avoidance 
Extant studies have examined the effects of firm-level characteristics on tax avoidance. For 
example, Gupta and Newberry (1997) document that effective tax rates are associated with a firm’s 
capital structure, asset mix, and performance. Subsequently, some papers incorporate agency 
considerations in the tax avoidance research. For instance, Phillips (2003) find that after-tax 
performance-based incentives increase tax avoidance, whereas Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
document that executive equity-based compensation deters tax avoidance among firms with 
weaker shareholder rights and lower institutional ownership. Furthermore, Desai and Dharmapala 
(2008) and Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) document that firms with concentrated 
ownership, such as family firms, avoid fewer taxes because controlling shareholders have a longer 
horizon and are more sensitive to the costs of tax avoidance arising from loss of reputation and 
suspicion of rent extraction from minority shareholders. 
The benefits and costs of tax avoidance are examined in various papers. On the one hand, 
tax avoidance provides benefits to shareholders and debt holders. Specifically, tax avoidance 
increases cash tax savings, which increase expected future cash flows (Dyreng et al. 2008; Hanlon 
and Heitzman 2010; Cook, Moser, and Omer 2017). Goh et al. (2016) document that tax avoidance 
is associated with a decrease in the cost of equity. Furthermore, this relationship is evidenced by 
the fact that firms provide incentives to executives to reduce tax burdens (Robinson, Sikes, and 
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Weaver 2010; Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker 2012). On the other hand, tax avoidance can impose 
costs to shareholders and debt holders. Tax avoidance can result in higher fees paid to tax 
consultants, greater penalties and interest paid to tax authorities, loss of reputation, reduced 
transparency, greater information asymmetry, and increased uncertainty about the firm’s future 
cash flows (Scholes, Wolfson, Erickson, Maydew, and Shevlin 2009; Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, 
and Shroff 2014; Desai and Dharmapala 2009; Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay 2017; Dhaliwal, 
Lee, Pincus, and Steele 2015). 
Finally, another line of literature examines the effect of tax avoidance on firms’ cost of 
debt. For example, Hasan et al. (2014) and Isin (2018) find that tax avoidance is associated with 
greater loan spreads. Similarly, Shevlin, Urcan, and Vasvari (2013) show that tax avoidance 
increases public bond yield spread. The findings in these studies suggest that debt holders are 
exposed to the risks arising from tax avoidance, but do not share the rewards from tax savings as 
much as shareholders do. Together, the literature provides evidence in support of both the benefits 
and costs of tax avoidance. 
2.2 Theory and literature on rollover risk 
Prior literature establishes theory of rollover risk by recognizing the risk as an important 
determinant that influences debt maturity choice (e.g., Diamond 1991; Flannery 1986). Diamond 
(1991) and Titman (1992) show firms may be confronted with challenges in rolling over their 
maturing debt in the presence of credit market frictions. Recent works extend this stream of 
research by documenting that rollover risk increases a firm’s default risk (e.g., He and Xiong 2012a, 
2012b). Specifically, He and Xiong (2012a) analyze a model where creditors choose to run from 
renewing a firm’s maturing debt. In this scenario, the existing creditor of the maturing debt is not 
only concerned about his or her own decision on whether to run on the firm, but also takes into 
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consideration whether or not creditors of future maturing debt are likely to run. Thus, the current 
creditor of the maturing debt can be shielded from the firm’s future rollover risk caused by other 
creditors. In equilibrium, each creditor will impose a higher threshold on the firm’s fundamentals 
when renewing debt in the presence of the problem of coordinating debt renewal with other 
creditors. When a firm suffers losses in rolling over its maturing debt, equity holders bear the 
losses while maturing debt holders receive full payments of the firm’s borrowings (He and Xiong 
2012b). This conflict between equity holders and debt holders prompts the firm to default at a 
higher than normal fundamental threshold. 
A number of empirical studies corroborate theory of rollover risk by documenting the 
effects of rollover risk on default risk (e.g., Wang et al. 2016), long-term bond spreads (Gopalan 
et al. 2014; Valenzuela 2016), and credit quality (Gopalan et al. 2014). Specifically, Wang et al. 
(2016) find that rollover risk is positively correlated with default risk for firms that rely heavily on 
bank financing. Valenzuela (2016) documents that rollover risk exacerbates the effect of debt 
market illiquidity on corporate bond spreads based on a data set of corporate bonds in the 
international markets. Gopalan et al. (2014) provide evidence that firms faced with higher rollover 
risk experience credit rating downgrades and bear higher yield spreads on the long-term bonds that 
they issue. Overall, both theoretical and empirical research has provided ample evidence on the 
ramifications of rollover risk on firms’ debt financing.  
2.3 Hypothesis development 
As discussed above, the possible outcomes associated with rollover risk can be very costly 
to the firms. Due to these detrimental effects of rollover risk, Harford et al. (2014) find that firms 
will increase their cash holdings and save more cash from their cash flows in order to mitigate 
rollover risk stemming from the firms’ maturing debt. Their finding suggests that firms desire 
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sufficient financial resources during debt refinancing. Following this rationale, firms may increase 
cash holdings by engaging in tax avoidance activities that generate cash savings by paying fewer 
cash taxes. The additional cash holdings through cash tax savings will not only help a firm pay 
down some of its maturing debt if needed, but also enable the firm to present a stronger financial 
outlook to its existing and potential creditors.  
However, the interest rates of debt may arise due to the firms’ engaging in tax avoidance 
(Hasan et al. 2014; Shevlin et al. 2013). This consequence may exacerbate the risk that the firms 
end up with a higher interest rate on the refinanced debt or are unable to roll over their maturing 
debt. Therefore, it is an empirical question as to whether the benefits of cash tax savings the firms 
receive (i.e., additional cash holdings) are greater or less than the costs the firms bear due to tax 
avoidance activities (i.e., higher interest costs of debt) in the presence of rollover risk. If the 
benefits exceed the costs (the costs exceed the benefits), then the firms will avoid more (fewer) 
taxes and we should observe a positive (negative) association between rollover risk and tax 
avoidance. We state Hypothesis 1 in the null form as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Rollover risk, measured as the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year to 
total assets, is not associated with tax avoidance. 
 
3 Research Methodology and Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we first define the measures of rollover risk and tax avoidance. Then, we 
discuss the research methodology, sample selection, and summary statistics.  
3.1 Empirical measure of rollover risk 
Following prior studies (Almeida et al. 2011; Gopalan et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2016), we 
measure rollover risk as the portion of long-term debt maturing within one year and exclude short-
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term debt to mitigate endogeneity in our analysis. Short-term debt is not included because a firm’s 
decision to issue or repay short-term debt is likely to be correlated with the firm’s current operating, 
investing, and financing activities as well as its tax avoidance activities. The long-term debt 
payable within a year, however, is a consequence of past debt financing choices made by the firm 
years ago. Therefore, the long-term debt maturing within a year is less likely to be endogenous 
with the firm’s current operating, investing, and financing activities or its contemporaneous tax 
choices. Under this design, we can explore whether ex-ante variation in maturing long-term debt 
is associated with current tax avoidance. Following prior studies (e.g., Gopalan et al. 2014), we 
construct our rollover risk measure LT_DUE1t−1 as the ratio of long-term debt maturing within a 
year (COMPUSTAT data item DD1) at the end of year t−1 to total assets (COMPUSTAT data 
item AT) at the end of year t−1. 
3.2 Measurement of tax avoidance 
Our study focuses on cash tax savings as an internal source of financing. As such, we define 
tax avoidance as “all actions taken by managers to reduce cash income tax liabilities of their firms” 
(Edwards et al. 2016, p. 862). The tax avoidance literature differentiates itself from tax evasion, 
which is an aggressive form of tax strategies oftentimes characterized as illegal. Specifically, we 
measure tax avoidance by cash effective tax rate (CETR) because the underlying assumption in 
this study is that cash tax savings help firms to resolve their cash needs problem during debt 
refinancing. Additionally, prior studies indicate that CETR captures all tax activities that reduce 
cash tax paid (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Higgins, Omer, and Phillips 2015). Finally, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) suggest that researchers choose the most appropriate measure of tax avoidance 
for their setting. Thus, we compute CETR as: 
 CETR = TXPD / (PI – SPI)                       (1) 
14 
 
where TXPD is cash income tax paid, PI is pretax income, and SPI is special items. All three 
variables are COMPUSTAT data items. Following prior studies, we eliminate observations with 
negative book income and truncate the values of CETR at 0 and 1. Based on this construct, a 
smaller (larger) value of CETR indicates higher (lower) tax avoidance.  
3.3 Empirical model 
To examine the association between rollover risk and tax avoidance, we estimate the 
following model: 
𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑈𝐸1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐷_𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝛽8𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽10𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡               (2) 
The definitions of variables are presented in the Appendix. We include industry and year fixed 
effects in the model to control for common effects among all firms in each industry and each year, 
respectively. εi,t is the error term, which has a zero mean for any values of the explanatory variables. 
We cluster standard errors by firm because the error term for each firm may be serially correlated.  
The main coefficient of interest is β1, which captures the relation between LT_DUE1i,t−1 
and CETRi,t. Hypothesis 1 is rejected if an association exists between rollover risk and tax 
avoidance, i.e., if β1 is significantly different from zero. We include several control variables in 
our regression model from prior literature to control for other well-known effects on tax avoidance 
(e.g., Mills, Erickson, and Maydew 1998; Hope, Ma, and Thomas 2013). Specifically, we follow 
prior literature and include NEG_ZSCOREi,t-1 to control for the effects of financial distress on tax 
avoidance. NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 is the negative Altman's Z-score at the beginning of the period. We 
multiply the original Altman's Z-score by −1 so that a larger value of NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 indicates 
greater financial distress. We also include SIZEi,t and MBi,t, which capture firms’ growth 
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opportunities and economies of scale. Next, we include prior operating loss carryforwards, NOLi,t, 
because utilization of prior loss carryforwards should reduce current period tax burdens. NOLi,t is 
measured as a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a net loss carry-forward, and 0 otherwise. Also 
included in the model is D_NOLi,t, an indicator variable equal to 1 if tax loss carryforward in year 
t is greater than tax loss carryforward in year t−1, and 0 otherwise. PRETAXINCi,t, EQINCi,t, and 
FORINCi,t control for firms’ profitability and complexity of firms’ operating environments. LEVi,t 
is included as a control variable to proxy for the effect of debt on firms’ incentives to avoid taxes. 
PPEi,t, RDi,t, and INTANGIBLEi,t are used to control for the differences in the book and tax 
reporting regimes.  
3.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
We start with a large sample of 233,525 U.S. firm-year observations spanning 1987-2016 
by obtaining financial data from COMPUSTAT to compute various variables. This original sample 
excludes firms with the SIC codes between 4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 6999. We present 
our sample selection criteria in Table 1, Panel A. We first eliminate 35,307 observations with 
missing data required to calculate LT_DUE1i,t−1. Then, we delete 110,770 observations with 
missing data required to compute cash effective tax rate or where pretax income is negative. Next, 
we discard 5,372 firm-years where CETRi,t is either smaller than zero or greater than one. Finally, 
we remove 40,157 observations with missing data required to calculate control variables. 
Following this procedure, we construct our main sample consisting of 41,919 firm-year 
observations with requisite variables for the main regression. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 1, Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the primary sample. The mean 
(median) value of CETRi,t is 0.256 (0.253), consistent with that reported in previous studies. The 
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mean value of LT_DUE1i,t−1 is 0.018, suggesting that for the average firm in our sample the amount 
of long-term debt maturing within a year is 1.8% of the firm’s total assets. The median value of 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 is 0.005, smaller than the mean, suggesting that the distribution of LT_DUE1i,t−1 in 
our sample is upwardly skewed. The summary statistics of control variables are in line with those 
reported in extant studies. 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 Simple correlations between rollover risk and tax avoidance 
We first examine the univariate relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance by 
analyzing Pearson correlations. Table 2 provides the results of this analysis. LT_DUE1i,t−1 is 
negatively correlated with CETRi,t, suggesting that firms with higher rollover risk have lower cash 
effective tax rates. In other words, rollover risk is positively associated with tax avoidance. This 
evidence rejects Hypothesis 1 that rollover risk is not associated with tax avoidance. In addition, 
the cash effective tax rate is positively (negatively) associated with a firm’s profitability (financing 
difficulty). For example, CETRi,t is positively correlated with firm size (SIZEi,t) and pretax income 
(PRETAXINCi,t) and negatively correlated with financial distress (NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1) and loss 
carry forwards (NOLi,t, D_NOLi,t). Finally, firms with more complex operating environments 
(EQINCi,t, FORINCi,t) and growth firms (MBi,t, RDi,t, INTANGIBLEi,t) have lower cash effective 
tax rate (CETRi,t). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Table 3 reports the empirical results for Equation (2) which examines the association 
between the long-term debt maturing within one year and tax avoidance. The coefficient on 
17 
 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 is negative and significant (Coefficient = −0.216; standard error = 0.033), suggesting 
that firms with higher debt rollover risk have lower cash effective tax rate. A one-standard-
deviation (0.031) increase in LT_DUE1i,t−1 is associated with a decrease of 0.0067 in CETRi,t, 
which represents a 2.62% decrease relative to the sample mean of CETRi,t (0.256). The 0.0067 
decrease in cash effective tax rate arising from a one-standard-deviation increase in LT_DUE1i,t−1 
represents U.S. $2.10 million of cash tax savings (0.0067×sample mean of pre-tax income less 
special items, i.e., U.S. $314.43 million).  
Since firms that face higher financial constraints also have incentives to increase the cash 
level by avoiding taxes, we calculate the effect of the financial constraint measure, 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1, on CETRi,t and use it as a benchmark to gauge the economic significance of 
the effect of LT_DUE1i,t−1 on CETRi,t. In comparison, a one-standard-deviation (5.237) increase in 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 is associated with a decrease of 0.0052 in CETRi,t, which represents a 2.04% 
decrease relative to the sample mean of CETRi,t (0.256). These results suggest that the effect of 
rollover risk on cash effective tax rate is economically significant because the magnitude of this 
effect is comparable to that of financial constraints on cash effective tax rate. In sum, the effect of 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 on CETRi,t is statistically and economically significant.  
The results from this multivariate analysis suggest that firms use cash savings from tax 
avoidance to reduce the rollover risk faced by them. Specifically,  firms with greater refinancing 
risk exhibit a lower cash effective tax rate, which indicates a positive association between rollover 
risk and tax avoidance, consistent with the notion that firms engage in tax avoidance to provide 
cash to facilitate debt refinancing. The results also suggest that when firms are faced with rollover 
risk, the benefit of cash tax savings, on average, exceed the cost of tax avoidance. 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
18 
 
4.3 Cross-sectional analyses 
4.3.1 Effect of financial constraints on the relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance 
A recent stream of literature on tax avoidance investigates the correlation between financial 
constraints and tax avoidance (Edwards et al. 2016; Law and Mills 2015). Specifically, Edwards 
et al. (2016) document that firms facing increases in financial constraints exhibit increases in cash 
tax planning. Law and Mills (2015) use a financial constraints measure based on firms’ qualitative 
disclosures, i.e., negative words in their annual reports, and find that financial constraints are 
associated with more aggressive tax planning strategies. Meanwhile, firms faced with rollover risk 
strive to increase cash holdings (Harford et al. 204), which can be partially accomplished through 
cash tax savings. Accordingly, we predict that firms with financial constraints must rely more 
heavily on cash savings generated by tax avoidance activities during the debt refinancing process. 
Therefore, the effect of rollover risk on tax avoidance for these financially constrained firms may 
be larger. Alternatively, because financially constrained firms likely bear higher interest rates on 
their debt due to lack of financial resources, they may be more sensitive to the incremental cost of 
interest if they engage in tax avoidance activities. Thus, when faced with rollover risk, these firms 
may choose to avoid taxes to a less degree in the presence of financial constraints. 
To test this empirical question, we add an interaction term between each of our financial 
constraint proxies and LT_DUE1i,t−1 in order to investigate whether financial constraints faced by 
the firm increase the relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance. In separate analyses, we 
adopt four different measures of financial constraints used in prior studies, including the 
availability of credit rating (NORATINGi,t−1), negative Z-score (NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1), firm size 
(SIZEi,t−1), and cash holdings (CASHi,t−1). NORATINGi,t−1 is equal to one if there is no credit rating 
in year t−1, and zero, otherwise. NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 is the negative Altman's Z-score at the 
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beginning of the period. We multiply the original Altman's Z-score by −1 so that a larger value of 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 indicates greater financial distress. SIZEi,t−1 is the natural log of the market 
value of equity in year t−1. CASHi,t−1 is cash at the beginning of the period divided by lagged 
assets.2 Firms with no credit rating and higher NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 face greater financial constraints, 
whereas firms that are larger in size or have greater cash holdings encounter less financial 
constraints. Therefore, according to our prediction, when we use NORATINGi,t−1 or 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 (SIZEi,t−1 or CASHi,t−1) as the proxy for financial constraints, the coefficient on 
the interaction between LT_DUE1i,t−1 and NORATINGi,t−1 or NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 (SIZEi,t-1 or 
CASHi,t-1) is expected to be negative (positive), suggesting that all four financial constraint 
measures intensify the negative relation between LT_DUE1i,t−1 and CETRi,t. In other words, the 
positive relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance is more pronounced when a firm has 
greater financial constraints. 
Table 4 presents the results for the effect of financial constraints on the relation between 
rollover risk and tax avoidance. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 show that the coefficients on 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × NORATINGi,t−1 and LT_DUE1i,t−1 ×NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 are negative and 
significant. In addition, the coefficient on LT_DUE1i,t−1 in Column (1) becomes insignificant, 
suggesting that firms with credit ratings do not avoid taxes when faced with rollover risk, possibly 
because firms with credit ratings can generate the cash needed for refinancing through new debt 
issuance. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 show that the coefficients on LT_DUE1i,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1 
and LT_DUE1i,t−1 × CASH,t−1  are positive and significant. These results suggest that financial 
constraints intensify the positive relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance. Because 
                                                          
2 We also include the stand-alone variables of financial constraint measures. However, since we include the concurrent 
SIZE and CASH as control variables in all of the regressions in this study, to the extent these two variables are serially 
correlated, we omit lagged SIZE and CASH as main effects in the regressions where we use SIZE and CASH as the 
proxies for financial constraints. 
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financially constrained firms have fewer financial resources at their disposal during refinancing, 
they are more likely to choose cash tax savings to increase cash holdings. In other words, when 
firms face rollover risk, tax avoidance provides even greater benefits than costs for firms with 
greater financial constraints compared with firms with fewer financial constraints. On the other 
hand, less financially constrained firms recognize the higher interest cost on refinanced debt and, 
therefore, engage in less tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.3.2 Effect of new debt financing on the relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance 
If the managers expect to fulfill the firms’ cash needs through debt refinancing, then they 
should rely less on tax avoidance to generate cash savings. More importantly, if they know that 
the new debt issuances can satisfy the firms’ cash needs during refinancing, then they will likely 
not engage in tax avoidance because doing so will make the new debt issuance more costly due to 
higher interest rates. In contrast, if the managers expect not to be able to obtain enough new debt 
to refinance the maturing debt, then the benefit of cash savings from tax avoidance is more 
pronounced. Therefore, we predict that firms’ access to cash through debt financing can moderate 
the positive relation between refinancing risk and tax avoidance. To test this prediction, we use 
debt issuance in year t as a proxy for a firm’s ability to refinance maturing debt. Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation:    
𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑈𝐸1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑈𝐸1𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷_𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡         (3) 
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In Equation (3), DEBTISSUEi,t is equal to one if long-term debt issuance in year t is greater 
than or equal to the long-term debt due in year t (COMPUSTAT item DLTIS in year t>=DD1 in 
year t−1). Other variables are as defined in the Appendix. If debt issuance reduces firms’ tendency 
to reserve cash through tax savings when they face rollover risk, then we expect  𝛽3 to be positive. 
Table 5 presents the results for the effect of firms’ ability to refinance maturing debt on the 
relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance. We find that the coefficient on 
LT_DUE1i,t−1×DEBTISSUEi,t is positive and significant (Coefficient = 0.244; Standard error = 
0.062). The results suggest that when firms with rollover risk expect that they are able to obtain 
cash from debt refinancing, they have fewer needs of using cash tax savings to increase cash 
holdings in order to reduce refinancing risk. In addition, the sum of 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 equals −0.077, 
which indicates the effect of rollover risk on cash effective tax rate for firms that are able to 
refinance maturing debt with new debt issuance. A test of 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 = 0 generates a p-value of 0.127, 
which fails to reject the null. This result suggests that firms that are able to issue enough debt to 
replace their maturing debt exhibit no association between rollover risk and tax avoidance. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
4.3.3 Effect of market interest rates on the relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance 
Prior research documents that corporate tax avoidance increases the cost of public debt and 
bank loans (Shevlin et al. 2013; Hasan et al. 2014). Because the interest rate of refinanced debt 
partly depends on the current market interest rate, during the period when the market interest rate 
is high, further conducting tax avoidance will make the interest rate of new borrowing to be higher 
for firms with rollover risk. This may cause the marginal cost of tax avoidance to exceed the 
marginal benefit of it for firms facing refinancing risk. Therefore, we predict that the magnitude 
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of the market interest rate will mitigate the positive relationship between rollover risk and tax 
avoidance. To test this prediction, we estimate the following model: 
𝐶𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑈𝐸1𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑇_𝐷𝑈𝐸1𝑖,𝑡−1 ×𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑁𝐸𝐺_𝑍𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷_𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝐵𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (4) 
where MKTRATEi,t is the commercial and industrial loan rates spreads over the intended federal 
funds rate. Following Officer (2007), we calculate a moving average using the four quarterly data 
ended in the fiscal year end for each firm-year. The higher this spread, the greater the cost of 
obtaining financing. If the magnitude of market interest rate attenuates the negative relation 
between rollover risk and cash effective tax rate, we predict 𝛽3 to be positive. 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results for the effect of market interest rate on the 
relationship between rollover risk and cash effective tax rate. We omit control variables for brevity. 
The coefficient on LT_DUE1i,t−1 × MKTRATEi,t is positive and significant at the five percent level 
(Coefficient = 0.141; Standard error = 0.059), suggesting that a higher market interest rate makes 
firms with rollover risk to avoid taxes to a lesser degree. This finding supports the notion that when 
the marginal cost of tax avoidance exceeds the marginal benefit of it, the degree of tax avoidance 
in firms with refinancing risk is less pronounced.  
 [Insert Table 6 about here] 
4.3.4 Interactive effect of financial constraints and market interest rates on the relation between 
rollover risk and tax avoidance 
In section 4.3.3, we find that the magnitude of market interest rate attenuates the positive 
relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance. On the other hand, in section 4.3.1, we show that 
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financial constraints magnify the positive relation between refinancing risk and tax avoidance. 
During the periods of higher market interest rates, the cost of further borrowing for financially 
constrained firms would be even higher relative to less financially constrained firms. Financially 
constrained firms would be less tax aggressive to mitigate the incremental increase in interest costs 
of additional refinancing above and beyond high market interest rates. In this section, we use three-
way interaction models to examine this prediction and show the interactive effect of market interest 
rate and financial constraints on the relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance. 
Specifically, we add to Equation (4) the main effects of financial constraints, the two-way 
interaction between LT_DUE1i,t−1 and financial constraints, and the three-way interaction among 
LT_DUE1i,t−1, MKTRATEi,t, and financial constraints. Similar to section 4.3.1, in separate models, 
we use four different measures to proxy for financial constraints, including the availability of credit 
rating (NORATINGi,t−1), negative Z-score (NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1), firm size (SIZEi,t−1), and cash 
holdings (CASHi,t−1).
3 
When the market interest rate is higher, if tax aggressiveness is too costly for financially 
constrained firms faced with rollover risk, tax avoidance would be less pronounced for these firms. 
Therefore, we predict that the coefficients on the three-way interaction among LT_DUE1i,t−1 , 
MKTRATEi,t, and the financial constraint measures to be positive when we use NORATINGi,t−1 and 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 as the proxies for financial constraints. On the other hand, the coefficients on 
the three-way interaction among LT_DUE1i,t−1, MKTRATEi,t, and the financial constraint measures 
are expected to be negative when we use SIZEi,t−1 and CASHi,t−1 as the proxies for financial 
constraints. 
                                                          
3 Similar to the earlier analysis with the financial constraint measures in Section 4.3.1, we include the concurrent 
SIZE and CASH as control variables in all of the regressions in this study. To the extent these financial constraint 
measures are serially correlated, we omit lagged SIZE and CASH as main effects in the regressions where we use 
SIZE and CASH as the proxies for financial constraints. 
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Panel B of Table 6 shows the results for the interactive effect of financial constraints and 
market interest rates on the relation between rollover risk and tax avoidance. For parsimony, we 
do not report the coefficient estimates on control variables. Similar to the results in Table 4, 
Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 6 show that the coefficients on 
LT_DUE1i,t−1×NORATINGi,t−1 and LT_DUE1i,t−1×NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 are still negative and 
significant. Columns (3) and (4) in Panel B of Table 6 show that the coefficients on LT_DUE1i,t−1× 
SIZEi,t−1 and LT_DUE1i,t−1×CASHi,t−1 are still positive and significant.  These results suggest that, 
ceteris paribus, tax avoidance is still more pronounced for financially constrained firms given 
rollover risk. More interestingly, Columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 6 show that, consistent 
with our prediction, the coefficients on LT_DUE1i,t−1×MKTRATEi,t×NORATINGi,t−1 as well as 
LT_DUE1i,t−1×MKTRATEi,t×NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 are positive and significant. Columns (3) and (4) 
present the evidence that the coefficients on LT_DUE1i,t−1×MKTRATEi,t×SIZEi,t−1 and 
LT_DUE1i,t−1×MKTRATEi,t×CASHi,t−1 are negative and significant. These results suggest, when 
market interest rates are higher, financially constrained firms would be less tax aggressive when 
they face rollover risk. These results are consistent with the notion that when the market interest 
rates are higher, firms with financial constraints face greater incremental refinancing costs than 
direct cash tax savings arising from tax avoidance. 
4.4 Additional analysis  
When a firm issues debt, lenders may evaluate the firm’s performance and financial 
position over a period of more than one year. Thus, the firm may begin to reserve cash through tax 
savings in year t in anticipation of debt maturing in year t+1 to reduce rollover risk. Specifically, 
in addition to the portion of long-term debt maturing in year t at the end of year t−1, i.e., 
LT_DUE1i,t−1, we include the portion of long-term debt maturing in year t+1 at the end of year 
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t−1, i.e., LT_DUE2i,t−1, in Equation (2). LT_DUE2i,t−1 is computed as COMPUSTAT data item 
DD2 in year t−1 divided by total assets in year t−1. 
Table 7 presents the results when we consider that firms may preempt tax avoidance 
activities in consideration of debt maturing in two years. Similar to the coefficient on LT_DUE1i,t−1, 
we find that the coefficient on LT_DUE2i,t−1 is also negative and significant (Coefficient = −0.061; 
standard error = 0.023). Although the magnitude of the coefficient for LT_DUE2i,t−1 is smaller 
than that for LT_DUE1i,t−1, the effect is still statistically significant. The results, in general, support 
the notion that firms use cash tax savings to reduce rollover risk arising from debt maturing in both 
one year and two years. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
4.5 Robustness tests 
We conduct several tests to provide robustness to our results. First, although we follow 
prior tax avoidance literature to include industry and year fixed effects and other firm-level factors 
as control variables in the main regressions, we might still omit some firm characteristics that 
might affect both cash effect tax rate and long-term debt maturing in one year. To reduce the 
possibility of omitted correlated variable problem, we replace industry and year fixed effects with 
firm and year fixed effects and reports the results in the Column (1) of Table 8. The coefficient on 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 is still negative and significant (Coefficient = −0.158; standard error = 0.038), 
suggesting that our results are not affected by omitted firm-specific factors. 
Second, as noted in Almeida et al. (2012) and Gopalan et al. (2014), in practice, firms’ 
long-term debt maturities tend to concentrate in a few periods, which is consistent with our results 
in descriptive statistics that our rollover risk measure, LT_DUE1i,t−1, is right-skewed. Therefore, 
rollover risk may only be an issue when the amount of maturing long-term debt is large enough. 
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To examine this possibility, we relax the assumption of a linear relation between rollover risk and 
tax avoidance. Specifically, we define a dummy variable, HIGH_LT_DUE1i,t−1, which equals one 
if the rollover risk measure LT_DUE1i,t−1 is greater than 0.049 (which is equal to its sample mean 
of 0.018 plus one standard deviation of 0.031), and zero otherwise. We replace LT_DUE1i,t−1 with 
this HIGH_LT_DUE1i,t−1 dummy in Equation (2). As shown in Column (2) of Table 8, we find a 
negative relationship between rollover risk measured by this dummy variable and cash effective 
tax rate (Coefficient = −0.019; standard error = 0.003). The results suggest that compared with 
firms with a lower level of LT_DUE1i,t−1, firms with a large amount of long-term debt due in one 
year (greater than 4.9 percent of total assets) exhibit a greater level of tax avoidance.4 This finding 
is consistent with our main finding of a positive relationship between rollover risk and tax 
avoidance based on the continuous rollover risk measure. 
Finally, our rollover risk measure, i.e., LT_DUE1i,t−1, results from past financing choices 
and should be exogenous to current tax avoidance activities. Nevertheless, one may still argue that 
smart CEOs may be able to forecast in year t−1 the firms’ tax avoidance activities and consequently 
the amount of cash savings from tax avoidance in year t. Thus, these managers may refinance in 
year t−1 some of the debt maturing in year t, which would affect LT_DUE1i,t−1 measured at the 
end of year t−1. To mitigate this concern, we replace debt maturing in one year at the end of year 
t−1 (LT_DUE1i,t−1) with debt maturing in two years at the end of year t−2 (LT_DUE2i,t−2) and 
repeat the regression of Equation (2). Given that LT_DUE2i,t−2 is based on the available 
information in year t−2, it is even less likely to be influenced by managerial anticipation of the 
firm’s tax avoidance activity in year t. The results are presented in Column (3) of Table 8. We 
                                                          
4 In addition to the cutoff of 0.049 based on the sample mean plus one standard deviation, we use alternative cutoffs 
at the 75th percentile or 80th percentile to define the HIGH_LT_DUE1i,t−1 dummy variable, respectively, the results 
are qualitatively similar. 
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continue to find a significantly negative relation between LT_DUE2i,t−2 and CETRi,t (Coefficient = 
−0.083; standard error = 0.023). Compared to the coefficient on LT_DUE1i,t−1 (−0.216) in Table 3, 
the coefficient on LT_DUE2i,t−2 reported here is smaller in magnitude, possibly because 
LT_DUE2i,t−2 contains more noise as a measure of rollover risk in regard to tax avoidance activities 
in year t due to a considerable lapse of time. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
5  Conclusion 
In this study, we examine whether rollover risk is associated with tax avoidance. Due to 
the detrimental consequences of rollover risk, firms may desire to use cash tax savings generated 
through tax avoidance to pay down some of their maturing debt or present a stronger financial 
position to their existing and potential deb holder. However, firms may also be concerned about 
the increase in the interest cost on their debt if they choose to avoid taxes. Thus, it is an empirical 
question as to whether the incremental benefits from cash savings as a result of tax avoidance are 
greater or less than the incremental costs of tax avoidance in terms of higher interests on refinanced 
debt. We test our hypothesis using a large panel data set spanning from 1987 to 2016 and find 
evidence of a positive association between rollover risk and tax avoidance, suggesting that, on 
average, the incremental benefit that firms receive from cash tax savings is greater than the 
incremental cost of interest that these firms bear.  
We corroborate our main finding by showing that the positive association is stronger for 
firms with financial constraints and weaker for firms whose issuances of new long-term debt are 
greater than or equal to the amount of maturing long-term debt. Moreover, we document that the 
positive relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance is less pronounced when the market 
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interest rates are higher, suggesting that the marginal cost of tax avoidance exceeds the marginal 
benefit of it during debt refinancing if the market interest rates are higher. Furthermore, we find 
evidence that the positive association between rollover risk and tax avoidance is further reduced 
for financially constrained firms in a high market-interest-rate environment. These results are 
consistent with the notion that when the market interest rates are higher, firms with financial 
constraints face greater incremental refinancing costs than direct cash tax savings arising from tax 
avoidance. Finally, we document that firms preempt their tax avoidance activities in anticipation 
of long-term debt maturing in two years. 
Our study contributes to the literature on tax avoidance and rollover risk in several aspects. 
First, our findings enrich the understanding of researchers on factors associated with firms’ tax 
avoidance activities. We document that a “real” corporate decision, i.e., maturing schedule of the 
long-term debt, is associated with tax avoidance. Additionally, our study extends the literature on 
the association between tax avoidance and cost of debt by documenting that firms engage in less 
tax avoidance due to concerns about incremental cost of debt under certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, our results extend the literature on rollover risk by providing evidence that firms 
mitigate rollover risk by generating cash savings from tax avoidance. Finally, our findings have 
practical implications for a firm’s choice of its debt maturity structure because credit frictions 
arising from it have an effect on tax avoidance activities. To the extent that debt holders, 
shareholders, and policy makers have an interest in the firms’ tax policies, a better understanding 
of the relationship between rollover risk and tax avoidance is important. Since shorter debt 
maturity leads to more frequent refinancing needs and rollover risk is positively associated with 
tax avoidance, firms should consider structuring the maturing schedules of their long-term debt in 
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a manner that reduces credit frictions and consequently rollover risk if the goal is to reduce tax 
avoidance activities. 
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Appendix: Variable Definition  
(In alphabetical order) 
 
Variables Definition 
CASHi,t 
Cash (COMPUSTAT data item CHE) at the end of the period divided by lagged 
assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
CETRi,t 
Income tax paid (COMPUSTAT data item TXPD) divided by pre-tax income 
(COMPUSTAT data item PI) less special items (COMPUSTAT data item SPI). 
We truncate the values at zero and one.  
D_NOLi,t 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if tax loss carryforward (COMPUSTAT data 
item TLCF) in year t is greater than tax loss carryforward in year t−1. 
EQINCi,t 
Equity income in earnings (COMPUSTAT data item ESUB) for firm i, year t, 
scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). We set equity income in 
earnings to zero if it is missing. 
FORINCi,t 
Foreign income (COMPUSTAT data item PIFO) for firm i, year t, scaled by 
lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). We set foreign income to zero if it 
is missing. 
INTANGIBLEi,t 
Intangible asset (COMPUSTAT data item INTAN) for firm i, year t, scaled by 
lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 
Long-term debt due in one year (COMPUSTAT data item DD1) at the 
beginning of the period, scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
LT_DUE2i,t−1 
Long-term debt due in two years (COMPUSTAT data item DD2) at the 
beginning of the period, scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
LT_DUE2i,t−2 
Long-term debt due in two years (COMPUSTAT data item DD2) at the 
beginning of the previous period, scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data 
item AT). 
LEVi,t 
Leverage for firm i, year t, measured as debt in current liabilities 
(COMPUSTAT data item DLC) plus long-term debt (COMPUSTAT data item 
DLTT) scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
MBi,t 
Market-to-book ratio for firm i, at the beginning of year t, measured as market 
value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item PRCC_F*CSHO), scaled by book 
value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item CEQ). 
NOLi,t 
Indicator variable coded as one if loss carry forward (COMPUSTAT data item 
TLCF) is positive as of the beginning of year t, and zero otherwise. 
PPEi,t 
Property, plant, and equipment for firm i (COMPUSTAT data item PPENT), 
year t, scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item AT). 
PRETAXINCi,t 
Pre-tax income (COMPUSTAT data item PI) minus extraordinary items 
(COMPUSTAT data item XI) scaled by lagged assets (COMPUSTAT data item 
AT). 
RDi,t 
R&D expense (COMPUSTAT data item XRD) scaled by lagged assets 
(COMPUSTAT data item AT). We set R&D expense to zero if it is missing.  
SIZEi,t 
The natural log of the market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item 
PRCC_F*CSHO) for firm i, at the end of year t. 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 
Negative Altman's Z-score at the beginning of the period calculated as −1×[1.2 
(Net working capital / Total assets) +1.4 (Retained earnings / Total assets) +3.3 
(Earnings before interest and taxes / Total Assets) +0.6 (Market value of equity 
/ Book value of liabilities) +1.0 (Sales / Total assets)]. We multiply the original 
Altman's Z-score by −1 so that a higher NEG_ZSCORE indicates higher 
financial distress.  
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Table 1 Sample Selections and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sample Selections 
Unique COMPUSTAT observations from 1987 to 2016 excluding firms in SIC 
codes between 4900 and 4999 or between 6000 and 6999 
 
      
233,525  
Delete: 
  
  Observations with missing data required to calculate LT_DUE1i,t−1 
 (35,307) 
  Observations with missing data required to calculate CETRs or with negative 
pretax income 
 
(110,770) 
  Observations with CETRs that are smaller than 0 or greater than 1 
 (5,372) 
  Observations with missing data required to calculate control variables 
 (40,157) 
Final Sample  41,919  
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile Std Dev 
CETRi,t 0.256 0.118 0.253 0.359 0.177 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 0.018 0.000 0.005 0.022 0.031 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 -5.138 -5.948 -3.825 -2.499 5.237 
SIZEi,t 5.938 4.282 5.960 7.544 2.293 
CASHi,t 0.174 0.027 0.090 0.237 0.215 
NOLi,t 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.500 
D_NOLi,t 0.218 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.413 
PRETAXINCi,t 0.131 0.058 0.104 0.171 0.109 
EQINCi,t 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 
FORINCi,t 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.034 
MBi,t 2.690 1.267 2.025 3.285 3.136 
LEVi,t 0.246 0.047 0.203 0.360 0.242 
PPEi,t 0.333 0.123 0.256 0.462 0.278 
RDi,t 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.053 
INTANGIBLEi,t 0.168 0.000 0.071 0.252 0.228 
Notes: Variables are as defined in Appendix. 
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Table 2 Pearson Correlations 
  CETR LT_DUE1 NOL D_NOL PRETAXINC EQINC FORINC MB SIZE LEV CASH PPE RD INTANGIBLE 
LT_DUE1 -0.083 
             
(0.000) 
             
NOL -0.302 0.098 
            
(0.000) (0.000) 
            
D_NOL -0.089 0.019 0.436 
           
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
           
PRETAXINC 0.014 -0.068 -0.180 -0.125 
          
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
EQINC -0.021 -0.001 0.007 0.015 0.016 
         
(0.000) (0.804) (0.131) (0.002) (0.001) 
         
FORINC -0.046 -0.042 0.173 0.132 0.121 0.021 
        
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        
MB -0.047 -0.011 0.031 0.013 0.299 0.015 0.140 
       
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
       
SIZE 0.009 -0.111 0.132 0.173 0.063 0.108 0.287 0.260 
      
(0.060) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
LEV -0.065 0.238 0.076 0.090 -0.144 0.023 -0.031 -0.028 0.048 
     
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
CASH -0.095 -0.131 0.053 0.004 0.369 -0.054 0.091 0.165 -0.048 -0.290 
    
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
PPE -0.083 0.046 -0.137 -0.023 0.010 0.019 -0.099 -0.049 0.081 0.274 -0.245 
   
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   
RD -0.114 -0.058 0.122 0.042 0.145 -0.051 0.165 0.162 0.003 -0.185 0.386 -0.253 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.580) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
INTANGIBLE -0.041 0.019 0.200 0.163 -0.061 -0.012 0.065 0.053 0.238 0.310 -0.114 -0.256 -0.033 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
NEG_ 
ZSCORE 
-0.065 0.229 0.183 0.089 -0.425 0.016 -0.033 -0.224 -0.025 0.327 -0.421 0.122 -0.181 0.078 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: p-values are in parentheses. Variables are as defined in Appendix. 
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Table 3 The Regression of Cash Effective Tax Rate and Refinancing Risk 
VARIABLES Dependent Var = CETRi,t 
    
LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.216*** 
 (0.033) 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
SIZEi,t 0.008*** 
 (0.001) 
CASHi,t -0.073*** 
 (0.006) 
NOLi,t -0.096*** 
 (0.003) 
D_NOLi,t 0.027*** 
 (0.002) 
PRETAXINCi,t -0.006 
 (0.012) 
EQINCi,t -1.190*** 
 (0.256) 
FORINCi,t -0.033 
 (0.039) 
MBi,t -0.003*** 
 (0.000) 
LEVi,t -0.020*** 
 (0.006) 
PPEi,t -0.090*** 
 (0.006) 
RDi,t -0.318*** 
 (0.026) 
INTANGIBLEi,t -0.028*** 
 (0.006) 
CONSTANT 0.363*** 
 (0.012) 
INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes 
Observations 41,919 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 
Notes: Please see the Appendix for variable measurements. For each variable, the standard error 
is reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by firm. Year and industry dummies 
are included in each specification, and for brevity, the results for these variables are not reported.  
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Table 4 Financial Constraint and the Relation between Refinancing Risk  
and Cash Effective Tax Rate 
 Dependent Var = CETRi,t 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES NORATINGi,t−1  NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1  SIZEi,t−1  CASHi,t−1 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 0.065  -0.351***  -0.688***  -0.259*** 
 (0.066)  (0.037)  (0.065)  (0.038) 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × NORATINGi,t−1 -0.358***        
(0.075) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 ×NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1   -0.060***     
   (0.009)     
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × SIZEi,t−1     0.095***   
     (0.011)   
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × CASH,t−1       0.270** 
       (0.116) 
NORATINGi,t−1 0.012***       
 (0.004)       
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
SIZEi,t 0.009***  0.008***  0.006***  0.008*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
CASHi,t -0.075***  -0.071***  -0.074***  -0.076*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
NOLi,t -0.095***  -0.096***  -0.095***  -0.097*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
D_NOLi,t 0.027***  0.027***  0.027***  0.027*** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
PRETAXINCi,t -0.007  -0.006  -0.001  -0.005 
 (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
EQINCi,t -1.182***  -1.190***  -1.200***  -1.177*** 
 (0.257)  (0.256)  (0.257)  (0.258) 
FORINCi,t -0.030  -0.035  -0.024  -0.033 
 (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040) 
MBi,t -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
LEVi,t -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.020***  -0.020*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
PPEi,t -0.090***  -0.091***  -0.088***  -0.090*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
RDi,t -0.321***  -0.313***  -0.315***  -0.323*** 
 (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.026) 
INTANGIBLEi,t -0.028***  -0.030***  -0.027***  -0.029*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
CONSTANT 0.351***  0.363***  0.373***  0.365*** 
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 (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 41,919  41,919  41,919  41,445 
Adjusted R-squared 0.169   0.170   0.170   0.168 
Notes: We adopt four different measures of financial constraints used in prior studies, 
including the availability of credit rating (NORATINGi,t−1), negative Z-score 
(NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1), firm size (SIZEi,t-1), and cash holdings (CASHi,t-1). NORATINGi,t−1 is 
equal to one if there is no credit rating in year t−1, and zero, otherwise. NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 is the 
negative Altman's Z-score at the beginning of the period. SIZEi,t−1 is the natural log of the market 
value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item PRCC_F*CSHO) for firm i at the beginning of year t. 
CASHi,t−1 is cash holding at the beginning of the period divided by lagged assets. We follow prior 
literature and use lagged SIZE and CASH as financial constraints measures. However, since we 
include the concurrent SIZE and CASH as control variables in Equation (2), to the extent these two 
variables are serially correlated, we omit lagged SIZE and CASH as main effects in the regressions 
where we use SIZE and CASH as the proxies for financial constraints. Please see the Appendix for 
the definitions of other variables. For each variable, the standard error is reported in parentheses. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm. Control variables as well as year and industry dummies 
are included in each specification, and for brevity, the results for these variables are not reported. 
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Table 5 New Debt Issuance and the Relation between Refinancing Risk  
and Cash Effective Tax Rate 
  (1) 
VARIABLES CETRi,t 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.321*** 
 (0.042) 
DEBTISSUEi,t -0.005**  
(0.002) 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × DEBTISSUEi,t 0.244*** 
 (0.062) 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
SIZEi,t 0.009*** 
 (0.001) 
CASHi,t -0.073*** 
 (0.006) 
NOLi,t -0.097*** 
 (0.003) 
D_NOLi,t 0.027*** 
 (0.003) 
PRETAXINCi,t -0.005 
 (0.012) 
EQINCi,t -1.206*** 
 (0.260) 
FORINCi,t -0.037 
 (0.039) 
MBi,t -0.003*** 
 (0.000) 
LEVi,t -0.023*** 
 (0.006) 
PPEi,t -0.091*** 
 (0.006) 
RDi,t -0.324*** 
 (0.026) 
INTANGIBLEi,t -0.027*** 
 (0.006) 
CONSTANT 0.366*** 
 (0.013) 
INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes 
Observations 40,445 
Adjusted R-squared 0.170 
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Notes: DEBTISSUEi,t is equal to one if long-term debt issuance in year t is greater than or equal to 
the long-term debt due in one year at the beginning of year t (COMPUSTAT item DLTIS>=DD1). 
Please see the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. For each variable, the standard 
error is reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by firm. Control variables as 
well as year and industry dummies are included in each specification, and for brevity, the results 
for these variables are not reported.  
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Table 6 
 
Panel A: Market Interest Rate and the Relation between Refinancing Risk and Cash Effective Tax 
Rate 
VARIABLES CETRi,t 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.496*** 
 (0.125) 
MKTRATEi,t 0.009 
 (0.012) 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × MKTRATEi,t 0.141** 
 (0.059) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Yes 
INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes 
Observations 41,919 
Adjusted R-squared 0.168 
Notes: MKTRATEi,t is the commercial and industrial loan rates spreads over the intended federal 
funds rate. For each firm-year, we calculate a moving average using the four quarterly data ended 
in the fiscal year end of each firm. Please see the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. 
For each variable, the standard error is reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered 
by firm. Control variables as well as year and industry dummies are included in each 
specification, and for brevity, the results for these variables are not reported. 
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Panel B: Market Interest Rate and the Relation between Refinancing Risk and Cash Effective Tax Rate-The Moderating Effect of Debt Financing Difficulty 
Market Interest Rate and No 
Rating 
 
Market Interest Rate and Z-score 
 
Market Interest Rate and Size  Market Interest Rate and Cash 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
VARIABLES CETRi,t  VARIABLES CETRi,t  VARIABLES CETRi,t  VARIABLES CETRi,t 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 0.409  LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.926***  LT_DUE1i,t−1 -1.281***  LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.645*** 
 (0.279)   (0.140)   (0.233)   (0.150) 
MKTRATEi,t 0.010  MKTRATEi,t 0.009  MKTRATEi,t 0.013  MKTRATEi,t 0.008 
 (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.012) 
NORATINGi,t−1 0.013***  NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 -0.001***  SIZEi,t 0.006***  CASHi,t -0.076*** 
 (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.006) 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
-0.162 
 LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
0.274*** 
 LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
0.299***  
LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
0.199*** 
 (0.122)   (0.063)   (0.111)   (0.072) 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 × 
NORATINGi,t−1 
-1.036*** 
 LT_DUE1i,t−1 × 
NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 
-0.153*** 
 LT_DUE1i,t−1 × 
SIZEi,t−1 
0.216***  
LT_DUE1i,t−1× 
CASHi,t−1 
1.252** 
 (0.298)   (0.034)   (0.044)   (0.544) 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
0.333** 
 LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
0.042*** 
 LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
-0.059***  
LT_DUE1i,t−1 
×MKTRATEi,t 
-0.504* 
×NORATINGi,t−1 (0.132)  ×NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 (0.016)  ×SIZEi,t−1 (0.020)  ×CASHi,t−1 (0.263) 
           
CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes 
 CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes 
 CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes  
CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes 
INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes  INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes  INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes  INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes  YEAR DUMMY Yes  YEAR DUMMY Yes  YEAR DUMMY Yes 
Observations 41,919  Observations 41,919  Observations 41,919  Observations 41,445 
Adjusted R-squared 0.169  Adjusted R-squared 0.170  Adjusted R-squared 0.170  Adjusted R-squared 0.168 
Notes: MKTRATEi,t is the commercial and industrial loan rates spreads over the intended federal funds rate. For each firm-year, we calculate a moving average 
using the four quarterly data ended in the fiscal year end of each firm. We adopt four different measures of financial constraints used in prior studies, 
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including the availability of credit rating (NORATINGi,t−1), negative Z-score (NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1), firm size (SIZEi,t-1), and cash holdings (CASHi,t-
1). NORATINGi,t−1 is equal to one if there is no credit rating in year t−1, and zero, otherwise. NEG_ZSCOREi,t−1 is the negative Altman's Z-score at the beginning 
of the period. SIZEi,t−1 is the natural log of the market value of equity (COMPUSTAT data item PRCC_F*CSHO) for firm i at the beginning of year t. CASHi,t−1 
is cash holding at the beginning of the period divided by lagged assets. We follow prior literature and use lagged SIZE and CASH as financial constraints 
measures. However, since we include the concurrent SIZE and CASH as control variables in Equation (2), to the extent these two variables are serially correlated, 
we omit lagged SIZE and CASH as main effects in the regressions where we use SIZE and CASH as the proxies for financial constraints. Please see the Appendix 
for the definitions of other variables. For each variable, the standard error is reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by firm. Control variables 
as well as year and industry dummies are included in each specification, and for brevity, the results for these variables are not reported.  
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Table 7 Effect of Debt Maturing in Both Year T and T+1  
on Cash Effective Tax Rate 
VARIABLES CETRi,t 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.209*** 
 (0.036) 
LT_DUE2i,t−1 -0.061*** 
 (0.023) 
CONTROL VARIABLES Yes 
INDUSTRY DUMMY Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes 
Observations 36,833 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173 
Notes: LT_DUE2i,t−1 is debt Maturing in two years at the end of year t−1, which is equal to 
COMPUSTAT data item DD2 in year t−1 divided by total assets in year t−1. Please see the 
Appendix for the definitions of other variables. For each variable, the standard error is 
reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by firm. Control variables as well as 
year and industry dummies are included in each specification, and for brevity, the results for 
these variables are not reported. 
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Table 8 Robustness Tests 
Firm and Year Fixed 
Effects  
HIGH_LT_DUE1t−1=1 if 
LT_DUE1t−1> 0.049  
Debt maturing in two years 
at the end of year t−2 
(LT_DUE2i,t−2) 
                                (1)                                    (2)                                    (3) 
VARIABLES CETRi,t  VARIABLES CETRi,t  VARIABLES CETRi,t 
LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.158***  HIGH_LT_DUE1i,t−1 -0.019***  LT_DUE2i,t−2 -0.083*** 
 (0.038)   (0.003)   (0.023) 
CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes  
CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes  
CONTROL 
VARIABLES Yes 
FIRM DUMMY Yes  
INDUSTRY 
DUMMY Yes  
INDUSTRY 
DUMMY Yes 
YEAR DUMMY Yes  YEAR DUMMY Yes  YEAR DUMMY Yes 
Observations 41,919   Observations 41,919   Observations 36,409 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.375   Adjusted R-squared 0.168   
Adjusted R-
squared 0.169 
Notes: Column (1) shows the results when we replace industry and year fixed effects with 
firm and year fixed effects. In Column (2), HIGH_LT_DUE1i,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 
one if LT_DUE1i,t−1 is greater than 0.049 (which is equal to its sample mean plus 1 standard 
deviation), and zero otherwise. In Column (3), LT_DUE2i,t−2 is debt maturing in two years at 
the end of year t−2, which is equal to COMPUSTAT data item DD2 in year t−2 divided by 
total assets in year t−1. Please see the Appendix for the definitions of other variables. For 
each variable, the standard error is reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered 
by firm.  
 
 
 
